Stewart Goetz, THE PURPOSE OF LIFE: A THEISTIC PERSPECTIVE by Seachris, Joshua
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 31 Issue 2 Article 8 
4-1-2014 
Goetz, THE PURPOSE OF LIFE: A THEISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Joshua Seachris 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Seachris, Joshua (2014) "Goetz, THE PURPOSE OF LIFE: A THEISTIC PERSPECTIVE," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 31 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol31/iss2/8 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
Faith and Philosophy232
pp. 232–236 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 31 No. 2 April 2014. All rights reserved
doi: 10.5840/faithphil20143127
I will close with a meta-concern.6 The pluralistic, many-spheres struc-
ture of Wolterstorff’s account implies that the Bible is not authoritative in 
politics; yet Wolterstorff develops his political philosophy by consulting 
the writings of the apostle Paul. The problem here is not that religious 
resources are inadmissible in politics. Wolterstorff describes the state as 
the “sphere of spheres,” as a sphere that encompasses all the others.7 So 
religious resources are admissible because resources from all human en-
terprises are admissible. We should design our government using the best 
of the business world, the best from religion, and so on. The problem is 
rather that anyone—Christian or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s 
view must also believe that principles from the Bible are not privileged 
in the sphere of spheres. We can consult the Bible, but only in the way 
that we would consult canonical economic texts, A Theory of Justice, Das 
Capital, journals of social science, or anything else. So no one—Christian 
or otherwise—who believes Wolterstorff’s political philosophy should 
believe it simply because it is the best interpretation of Paul. Wolterstorff 
therefore has to defend his view on its merits, which is a task The Mighty 
and the Almighty leaves undone. I mean this as a call for more work, not as 
knockdown criticism—there is no a priori reason why views inspired by 
the Bible cannot be defended on their merits.™
The Mighty and the Almighty is a worthwhile read. Wolterstorff’s Pauline 
account of the state is interesting in its own right—not least because it ex-
plains why institutions, as well as individuals, can be right-holders. This 
is a significant departure from the individualism of most western politi-
cal philosophy, and it is a plausible one. Interesting philosophical projects 
raise new questions as they solve old problems; we should look forward 
to reading Wolterstorff’s answers.
Because he thinks the state is supposed to curb wrongdoing in general, Wolterstorff’s politi-
cal theology may, depending upon which rights he emphasizes, support a view that is more 
progressive than liberalism.
6I am indebted, here, to a conversation with Russ Pryba.
7Ibid., 166.
The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, by Stewart Goetz. London and 
New York: Continuum, 2012. 189 pages. $24.00 paper.
JOSHUA SEACHRIS, University of Notre Dame
In The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective, Stewart Goetz contributes to 
the expanding discussion within analytic philosophy on life’s meaning. 
Regrettably, for the better part of the last century analytic philosophers 
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devoted next to no attention to a topic at the heart of the human condi-
tion—the meaning of life. However, recent momentum in the other direc-
tion is encouraging, and Goetz’s new book adds energy to this young, yet 
developing body of research.
The question of life’s meaning is, to some extent, vague, so any book-
length discussion of the topic should address the thorny interpretive issue 
of how to understand what the question is asking. Goetz begins here in 
chapter 1 by distinguishing the following three questions:
(Q1) What is the meaning of life?
(Q2) What makes life meaningful?
(Q3) Is life meaningful?
He advocates an individualist-teleological interpretation of (Q1): “What is 
the purpose of my life?” His understanding of (Q1), though, is not solely 
individualist, for he is concerned with the ultimate end for which we all 
as individuals exist. The purpose has a global dimension in that it applies 
to everyone collectively. He thinks a plausible understanding of (Q2) is: 
“What makes life worth living?” Finally, he views (Q3) as asking some-
thing like the following: “Does life make any sense in terms of fitting to-
gether in an intelligible way?” Goetz correctly notes that while (Q1)–(Q3) 
can be distinguished, they are inter-connected such that an answer to one 
will influence answers to the other two. Hence, though his primary aim 
in the book is to answer (Q1)—under his preferred interpretation—he has 
much to say about both (Q2) and (Q3).
Because a large part of figuring out what the meaning of life is (or 
might be) is first deciding on a plausible interpretation of the question, 
it is worth lingering here a bit. I am sympathetic to the interpretive hy-
pothesis vis-à-vis (Q1) around which Goetz frames the book. However, I 
subtly part interpretive ways with him on this point. I think a good case 
can be made that (Q1), rather than being understood as a request for the 
purpose of life, is a request that is more expansive—a question about all of 
this, where “all of this” is, indeed, the entire space-time universe. And, it is 
not primarily a question about the purpose of all of this. I have argued that 
the request, once we (i) unpack the assumptions out of which it is asked, 
(ii) try to account for the numerous sub-questions “embedded” within it, 
and (iii) consider other desiderata of a compelling interpretation, is most 
plausibly viewed as a request for something like an overarching narra-
tive that provides a framework or background picture (to borrow from 
Charles Taylor), vantage point, or deep context that brings intelligibility 
to the existentially salient parts of existence and grounds a praxis for liv-
ing meaningfully in the world. No doubt, such a narrative would have 
elements that address questions of purpose, in addition to saying some-
thing about origins, suffering, and death, for example. Importantly, this 
narrative-interpretation of the meaning-of-life question is able to unify the 
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many sub-questions embedded within the grand question under a single 
interpretive construct—a narrative or narrative-like framework.
Though we differ on this interpretive matter, we do not disagree about 
the need for a narrative as such—Goetz thinks something like a global 
narrative is critical. And any difference we have here is over where the 
meaning of life question arises and takes initial existential hold: at the 
personal level or the cosmic level? Whereas he thinks that people generally 
begin with personal narrative concerns, I have, up to this point at least, ad-
vocated a position that stresses the priority of cosmic narrative concerns. 
Goetz thinks that we start locally and move increasingly outward in our 
narrative thinking, and I have developed a line of thought that largely 
moves in the opposite direction. The question, then, is do we move from 
the self to the world or from the world to the self?
After settling on his preferred interpretation of (Q1), Goetz enlists 
Richard Taylor, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Thomas Nagel as interlocutors in 
developing his own position that perfect happiness is the meaning (purpose) of 
life, where happiness is a state consisting of the experience of pleasure(s), 
pleasure is an intrinsic (though non-moral) good pursued for its own sake, 
and perfect happiness is the uninterrupted and unending experience of 
nothing but pleasure(s). In the balance of the book, he builds his case in 
support of this claim about life’s purpose. Importantly, according to Goetz, 
discerning this purpose for which humans are created need not presup-
pose access to special revelation or Scripture. Rather, it is available via the 
deliverances of natural reason. Equally as important, however, (and this 
is where the theistic/religious component enters) is his view that if we are 
to believe that life is ultimately meaningful (where perfect happiness and 
perfect justice coalesce), we will be rationally driven to admit that God 
exists (as a side note: one might think that if we hope (as a propositional 
attitude governed by more lenient epistemic standards than belief) that 
there is some future state of affairs where perfect happiness and perfect 
justice unite, we will be practically driven to accept that God exists). In ad-
dition to his claim that perfect happiness (and therefore meaningful life) 
requires God in order to ultimately harmonize happiness and justice, he 
notes that his view also requires (i) an afterlife, (ii) a soul, since many think 
something like a soul is a necessary condition for surviving the demise of 
the body (though materialists who affirm the possibility of post-mortem 
existence will disagree here), and (iii) free-will to make (at least some) 
undetermined self-forming choices (SFCs, a la Robert Kane) en route to 
embracing what he calls “life-plans” that consist of the most broadly influ-
ential SFCs about when and how an agent will maximize her happiness.
In the heart of the book, chapters 2 through 4, Goetz engages in a nega-
tive project of answering objections to his central claim, though through 
the process of engaging his critics he clarifies his perfect happiness ac-
count of life’s meaning. The first two groups of objections (chapters 2 and 
Three) are aimed at his claim that perfect happiness is the meaning of 
life. The third set of objections (chapter 4) is aimed at a key component 
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built into the edifice of his interpretation—the existence of purpose and 
the legitimacy of teleological explanations. In chapter 2, he considers a 
number of atheistic objections to perfect happiness being the meaning of 
life, including Bernard Williams’s famous criticism of the very coherence 
of unending happiness (unending happiness is entailed by Goetz’s under-
standing of perfect happiness). He also puts Bertrand Russell and George 
Mavrodes in conversation with one another on the question of why one 
should be moral. He argues that in a “Russellian” world being immoral is 
overall as rational as being moral in that being immoral is sometimes in 
one’s best interests. Like Mavrodes before him, Goetz claims that a Rus-
sellian world leads to deep absurdities. A salient kind of absurdity that 
characterizes a Russellian world, according to Goetz, is a function of our 
lives not fitting together intelligibly (and thus a “no” answer is required 
for (Q3)). More specifically, the tension between the moral demands on us 
and our happiness will never be resolved. Since perfect justice and perfect 
happiness do not coalesce in this life, and since there is neither a God nor 
an afterlife in a Russellian world, we are left with an ultimately meaning-
less world. A meaningful world is one where, at a minimum, those who 
act morally never end up worse off in terms of their own well-being when 
all is said and done. A Rusellian world, argues Goetz, is not such a world. 
Not a few think that a Russellian world is a meaningless world, at bottom. 
Goetz has given yet another reason for thinking so.
In chapter 3, Goetz addresses objections that originate within the theis-
tic camp. The objections are every bit as numerous and heated here. They 
range from the claim that the meaning of life is a who (i.e., God) and not a 
what to the worry that the perfect happiness view advocates a narcissism 
that is inimical to core tenets of Christian theism. Prima facie, cashing out 
the meaning of life in hedonistic terms (though his view is not “hedonism” 
whereby pleasure is the only intrinsic good) might appear to be in con-
siderable tension with core elements of many venerable Christian tradi-
tions—for example, Christian traditions that claim that the chief end of 
man is to glorify and enjoy God forever (see the Westminster Standards) 
or that the world was made for the glory of God (see the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church) whereby God and his glory is the final end toward which 
we ought to aim. It might also seem to be in tension with the testimony of 
Jesus and the Apostles who summon those who would be disciples to take 
up their crosses, put others first, die to self, lose one’s life, and so on. So, 
some worries lurk. But Goetz has plausible answers, I think, for these sorts 
of objections. Using an effective strategy of employing legendary Chris-
tian spokespersons such as St. Augustine and C. S. Lewis to answer these 
in-house objections, Goetz demonstrates that once we carefully unpack 
the idea of perfect happiness being the meaning of life, it is quite consis-
tent with what many adherents embrace as non-negotiable elements of 
Christian theology and praxis.
In chapter 4, the bulk of Goetz’s discussion centers on implications that 
the causal closure principle has for purpose and teleological explanation. 
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Given his view’s need of teleology, the independent plausibility of his 
view in its own right, and independent reasons for rejecting the causal 
closure principle, he sees no compelling reason to reject all teleological 
explanation. Indeed, he sees naturalism, not science, as the primary moti-
vator for rejecting purposeful explanation (here, he incorporates material 
from his co-authored book with Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Eerdmans, 
2008)). The purpose that his perfect happiness account requires (at both 
personal and cosmic levels) is threatened, not by science, but by a ques-
tionable naturalism, so he argues.
Finally, in chapter 5 he concludes by bringing his perfect happiness 
view of life’s meaning into conversation with important issues at the fore 
in discussions over the problem of evil and eschatology. Along the way 
he interacts with strategies enlisted by some theistic philosophers to neu-
tralize the problem of evil, most notably skeptical theism. He even devel-
ops his own theodicy, incorporating the idea of perfect happiness. This is 
surely a place where Goetz’s book gestures both directly and indirectly to 
the need for increased theoretical development—questions at the intersec-
tion of the meaning of life and the problem of evil in general, the meaning 
of life and skeptical theism in particular, and the connection between end-
ing, death, and life’s meaning.
The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective makes an important contribu-
tion to the growing discussion within analytic philosophy over life’s mean-
ing. Goetz covers a lot of interesting philosophical territory to make his 
case—value theory, naturalism, reductionism, the problem of evil, even 
heaven and hell. His choice of interlocutors is equally as interesting: St. 
Augustine, Bertrand Russell, C. S. Lewis, Daniel Dennett, Thomas Nagel 
and Alvin Plantinga to name a few. Those interested in a monograph-
length discussion of life’s meaning from a theistic perspective will want to 
read this book. I hope that Goetz’s contribution motivates others to work 
further (or for the first time) in this area.
Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature 
Is Almost Certainly False, by Thomas Nagel. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. x + 130 pages. $24.95 cloth.
WILLIAM JAWORSKI, Fordham University
Thomas Nagel argues in his most recent book that the materialist world-
view which has come to dominate academic philosophy and the non-
academic philosophizing of many scientists cannot provide an adequate 
explanation of life’s origins. As a result, Nagel proposes that we consider 
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